Grace Creek Media

"Ideas in Action"

INTERVIEW WITH TOM DONNELLY, ANDREW EXUM, MATTHEW HOH

Media ID: IIA Afghan Surge

     (MUSIC)

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Welcome to Ideas in Action, a television series about ideas and their consequences.  I'm Jim Glassman.  This week the surge in Afghanistan.  Will the buildup of U.S. forces in Afghanistan lead to the same success that it did in Iraq?  The Taliban has been fighting an insurgency against the government of Afghanistan led by Hamid Karzai for the past nine years.  Now President Obama is pursuing a military surge sending thousands more troops to oust the Taliban.

 

He's basing his strategy on the same one used during the Bush administration to break the resistance in Iraq.  But not everyone agrees the U.S. was successful in Iraq or that it can be in Afghanistan.  Joining me to discuss this topic are Thomas Donnelley, director of the Center for Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.  He worked with a group of military experts to develop the strategy for a military surge in Iraq.

 

Matthew Hoh, served as a marine captain in Iraq.  In 2009 he went to Afghanistan as a civilian political officer.  He resigned later that year protesting continued U.S. involvement in what he termed a 35-year-old civil war.  Andrew Exum, a fellow with the center for a New American Security.  He served as an army captain in Afghanistan.  He's helped assess the current strategy there as a civilian advisor to General Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan.  The topic this week, the surge in Afghanistan.  Can the U.S. use the same playbook it used in Iraq?

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     JIM GLASSMAN:

In 2001 the U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom.  Liberating the Afghan people from the tyranny of the Taliban.  A new democratically elected government led by Hamid Karzai began trying to rebuild a society and infrastructure left in ruins by decades of war.

 

But the rugged Afghan terrain and poorest Pakistani border allowed the Taliban to take refuge and regroup for an insurgency that lasts to this day.  Taking a lead from the success in Iraq, in 2008 President Bush began an increase of U.S. troops in Afghanistan that became the foundation for the Obama administration surge strategy.

 

With plans to ultimately raise the level of U.S. troops to a total of 100,000, the U.S. is still confronting a country filled with fractious, tribal leaders and a government overshadowed by corruption.  The question this week, is the U.S. surge bringing Afghanistan any closer to a stable democracy?  Tom Donnelly, you helped devise the strategy that President Bush used for a surge in Iraq.  Why do you think the same kind of surge will work in Afghanistan?

     TOM DONNELLY:

Well, just to correct the record slightly.  My role was much more political.  And the credit for making the surge work goes to Generals Petraeus and Odierno and the men and women who actually made it so.  But with that small self-- saving caveat, it is the best idea that we've got.  It is-- a plan that in broad outline is applicable.  The wars are obviously quite different.  The circumstances are different.  Our interests are different.  But if we are going to be successful in Afghanistan-- and I think we need to be successful in Afghanistan, it's the best idea we have.  And-- there's at least an opportunity, a possibility that this will work.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Andrew you work with-- General McChrystal.  How do you think the surge is working now?

     ANDREW EXUM:

I think that the military operations in Helmand Province and Kandahar Province have gone quite well.  I don't think there is any-- any-- real debate about whether or not we succeeded tactically in Iraq during the-- during the surge.  The debate seems to be whether or not we were able to succeed strategically in-- in creating the political outcome.

 

And I think we've had similar success in Afghanistan.  I think we've also been able to make large strides in building up Afghan capacity.  The problem is, is that with respects to the Afghan government we do not have a coherent political strategy.  And the trick is in both Iraq and Afghanistan-- whenever you wage counterinsurgency on behalf of the host nation your success depends in large part upon what that host nation government does or fails to do.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Matthew, you felt so strongly that what we were doing in Afghanistan was wrong and that it wouldn't know that you quit.  That you left the state department.  How do you think things are working out now?

     MATTHEW HOH:

I don't think they're any better than they were.  The idea of taking-- the surged-- or the-- the a-- operations we did in Iraq and implementing them in Afghanistan-- there's too many differences.  The terrain, the geography, the population, the nature of the enemy-- the modern history of the countries-- the-- the forms of government that have existed there.  It's too different.

 

And-- and so-- strategy that says that we are going to put troops into an area-- where foreign occupation has always been fiercely resisted and that we are going to then help build up institutions to deliver services to people that don't exist and have never existed.  And that this will then cause those local residents or these rural village in the valleys to then align themselves or embrace a government f-- composed of outsiders as well as foreign occupiers at the expense of-- the Taliban who are ethnically and culturally similar-- to them it's just-- it's just not going to work in-- in those rural parts of-- of eastern and southern Afghanistan.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Isn't-- isn't a United States backed Karzai government more palatable than the Taliban?

     MATTHEW HOH:

No.  And the Taliban are not palatable-- either.  But the problem is if you have to decide-- if you're a rural Pashtun in the southern and eastern parts of the country and you have to decide between the Karzai government backed by American and western soldiers or the Taliban you're going to choose the Taliban.  And that's why some of us have been saying our presence there fuels support for the Taliban.  That-- that-- what that does is that-- if you pull our forces out-- if you don't-- if we're not there the support for the Taliban dwindles.  And we're starting' to see that in-- eastern--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

But-- but--

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Afghanistan in c--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Let me just challenge your-- your premise.  Why do you feel that people will not back a United States backed Karzai government versus the Taliban which is really-- a blood thirsty outfit that-- that murders women in stadiums and that d-- doesn't allow women to go to school.  I mean, we-- we--

     MATTHEW HOH:

Yeah, I mean--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--All know the--

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Basic--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--We all know the problems of the Taliban.

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Basically the crux of it is though is that those people fought on the side of the Taliban against the Karzai government. And those that compose the Karzai government for the better of part of 35 years.  This is a war that's been going on since 1975 more or less.

 

And-- and so what we've done is we're backing one side of the civil war.  So what we need to do-- and this is-- a failure of the bomb process after September 11th was that we didn't include the rural Pashtuns into the government to the extent it should have been.  And that's a problem is that yes about 70 percent of Afghanistan wants the American support, is in favor of the Karzai government.

 

But there's another 30 percent that's outside of that government.  And that's violently opposed to occupation.  We need to bring that 30 percent back into the government-- otherwise they're always going to oppose it.  And-- and they'll continue to take up rifles against it.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Tom-- Tom what--

     (OVERTALK)

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--About the--

     TOM DONNELLY:

--I would say Matthew's reading is correct as far as it goes.  But a selective one.  First of all, there are no, you know, not foreign backed forces in Afghanistan.  Everybody is aligned with outside actor.  And the ultimate question is of course who's going to win the war?  Who's-- who's going to have the strongest military coalition n? And who's going to have the most durable political coalition.

 

There's no opportunity for a Pashtun-- exclusive Pashtun government to govern Afghanistan and keep it together.  Conversely, there's no-- prospect for a government that doesn't include a large aspect of Pashtun-- participation.  So it's got to be a coalition among all the peoples-- of Afghanistan.

 

And Karzai is by far the closest analog to that or the most representative and the broadest coalition.  That's why there wasn't an affective challenge to him in the election.  And that's why despite the fact that the Obama administration has been holding its nose very publically about him, he remains the least bad alternative.  And what will happen if we withdraw is not that there'll be a renewed civil war just amongst Afghans.  But there will be other outside actors backing local militias who will then squabble over the carcass of Afghanistan with probably the same result that we saw the first-- the last time around-- where in the Pakistani backed-- Taliban becomes at least in the south the most dominant force.  And once again it becomes a playground for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

And why-- why should the U.S. care?

     ANDREW EXUM:

We've got two basic interests in Afghanistan.  And not just Afghanistan but the-- the greater region.  Afghanistan is in many ways-- the least important of the-- the two interests. We have an interest that Afghanistan is not used as a safe haven for transnational terror groups to attack the United States.  And right now we've pretty much-- we're securing that interest right now.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

A lot of people by the way--

     ANDREW EXUM:

We can--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Say that that's our only interest. And we seem to have secured that interest as you say.

     ANDREW EXUM:

--Not in an enduring way.  Unless you want to garrison Afghanistan in perpetuity then-- then we haven't secured that interest.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Matthew-- this question that I asked about, you know, why are we there anyway?  I mean, if-- if-- if we did abandon Afghanistan certainly you would admit that the chances that, for example, it could be used as a base against us-- rise.

     MATTHEW HOH:

Well, you know, here-- here's the problem is that-- I don't think you're seeing people advocating for abandoning Afghanistan.  What I'm saying is that continued military effort there is only going to increase instability.  As we push more troops into these valleys and villages of southern Afghanistan we're encountering resistance. We're encountering people who are going to fight us because we're occupying them.

 

So the thing we have to do is find a political situation-- a po-- a political solution-- to bring about stability in that country.  And then once you have political stability then you can actually talk about security.  Then you can talk about development.  Then you can talk about having a stable Afghanistan that's not a problem for its neighbors.

 

Because I agree.  You ha-- we have to have a stable Afghanistan because it's a very important part of the world.  But we're not going to do it on the backs of 100,000 American troops.  We're going to do it through political negotiations and getting a political settlement.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

But you were in there as-- as-- as a civilian doing political work I assume.  And so why did you just throw up your hands and say-- "Gee I don't want to do this anymore?"

     MATTHEW HOH:

I-- I did not want to continue an effort that was failing or continue an effort that was flawed-- where our leaders were not acknowledging the reality of the situation-- on the ground playing t--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Let-- let-- let me ask you--

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Playing to a political narrative.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Let me ask everyone about when you talk about a political solution or it's a political problem which I think all of us would-- would agree with.  What does that mean about Taliban participation in the-- in the government or in some kind of governmental authority-- either-- either regionally or throughout the entire country?

     MATTHEW HOH:

Afghans have traditionally-- self-governed themselves. They've traditionally governed at the lowest level possible.  When the king ruled Afghanistan it was a fairly stable period of time because he reigned by not reigning.  And the different regions ruled themselves.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

And what period was that?

     MATTHEW HOH:

This was from 19-- 23 through 19-- or 1933 through 1973.  And it's a fairly stable-- stable period.  But-- so what you have to do is-- is right now-- so in Marjah we had this offensive which was tactically a success.  We brought in a man who'd been living in Germany-- an ex-con nonetheless-- for 15 years to rule Marjah.

 

The Afghan army and Afghan police forces are not from that area.  These are outsiders, they're not welcome there.  That's what I mean about political solution.  We've got to bring these people who are outside the government back into the government-- in order to bring about stability--

     (OVERTALK)

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Because without that you won't have anything.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Should the Taliban have a role in-- in-- in a-- some kind of a reconciliation government?

     TOM DONNELLY:

I-- I actually think we should stop using the term Taliban.  Because it's such a catchall phrase.  Sure there are-- people who we would refer to the Taliban or other Afghans would refer to as--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Oh it means--

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Taliban.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--teacher, right?

     TOM DONNELLY:

It means student--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Students-- or student sorry.

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Actually.  But, I mean, the Taliban leadership-- the Qwed Ashura so-called, Mullah Omar, the-- who was the head of the-- or not really the head of state.  But the-- the inspirational leader of the Taliban government back in the battle days who's still around.  There's no place for him or guys like that.  They are committed Islamists.  And-- and those are the guys who are really loathed by Afghans and basically anybody who's ever had anything to do with them.  So there's no role for those guys.

 

But there are a lot of local strong men, local tribal and clan leaders who are sometimes referred to as Taliban or sometimes called Taliban.  And we should try to reconcile with them, peel them off, find a place for them to work constructively inside.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

And again this is-- we-- we kind of did this in Iraq.

     TOM DONNELLY:

Yeah, I-- we've been doing it actually, you know, not all that well.  But people have tried this in Afghanistan all through the intervening years.  Really what makes people hop back and forth across this fence in Afghanistan is they don't know how the war's going to come out.

 

So if you can convince the marginal Taliban that their long-term security future-- 'cause that's the thing people care about the most.  It's why they got to be safe.  If you can convince them that they've got a safe future-- and-- Af-- Afghanistan that's-- as you suggest we're trying to build, yeah we could peel those guys off.  And we would want to.  And we're trying to.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

So there-- there-- there's-- Tom is saying we got to win the war.  And Matthew is saying that in-- in injecting more troops we're causing more trouble.  Where do you come down?

     ANDREW EXUM:

Yeah, first off let me say that, I mean, I think we all agree that insurgencies-- civil wars end with some sort of political process.  The problem is right now is-- and I actually disagree with-- with Tom with respect to-- to talking to the-- the-- the senior Taliban.  I think that unfortunately-- those that have the-- the legitimacy to actually push forward with the deal might be some of those that are in the Qwed Ashura.  You know, some of the-- some of the old line Taliban leaders.

 

And actually it's that generation that's below them that are actually been much more radicalized since September 11th, 2001.  The one thing I'll say is that-- you know, s-- as my friend Steve Bittle says the-- the Taliban is not going to accept the loaf of bread if they think the bakery is going to be unguarded tomorrow.

 

So you have to set the conditions for a political process.  You can't-- I mean, we can all say we'd like a political process.  I'd like a political process.  But you see in the background U.S. capital.  It's-- it can be a difficult thing for it to happen even in a staple secure democracy.

 

You have to set the conditions and that's exactly what the United States is trying to do.  You have to convince people that their long-term future is-- is-- is held in negotiations.  Is held-- that-- with aligning-- with the-- the U.S. and its coalition allies.  With the-- the Karzai regime.

 

You can't just hope that sec-- you know, negotiations can-- can lead to an outcome. And one of the things we've found in civil wars and insurgencies throughout history is that usually have to establish some degree of control over the population before collaboration before reconciliation can-- can take place.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

But what Matthew is saying that-- that by trying to establish control-- that is to say by having more troops go in you're actually making the problem worse.  You--

     ANDREW EXUM:

I d--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Just disagree.

     ANDREW EXUM:

--Yeah, I don't know what-- I mean, I-- I'd be interested to hear what empirical-- research you're-- you're basing this on.  I don't--

     MATTHEW HOH:

Just on--

     ANDREW EXUM:

--Think that--

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Just on my experiences there in both the east and southern part.  And we-- and we see it actually.  There was a great article in the Wall Street Journal on March 26th about how we're pulling our troops out of eastern Afghanistan and the Pakistan border and stability is occurring there.  And that's actually where the second largest insurgence group went to-- Kabul with a 15 point piece plan.  And they're operating in areas where we're actually withdrawing our troops.  In the south where we're pushing more troops in we're seeing calls to fight us.  Y-- and you're seeing the most violent elections.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Andrew?

     ANDREW EXUM:

We knew that if you-- we knew that if you tried to go into places where we had not previously had presence you're going to have a spike in violence.  That's a horrible metric--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

But then knowing--

     ANDREW EXUM:

--To use--

     (OVERTALK)

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--When to--in Iraq as well is--

     (OVERTALK)

     ANDREW EXUM:

--Right yeah.  Absolutely.

     MATTHEW HOH:

Well, you know, and Iraq was different though.  I mean, I was in Anbar Province during the surge and participate in those operations there.  And it was the U.S. versus Al Qaeda in Anbar province.  You could drive a wedge between the population and the insurgency because Al Qaeda was-- was-- was-- all they offered was murder and intimidation.  And they were not from there, they were outsiders.  The problem in Afghanistan-- and we were saying this was that-- how do you drive a wedge between the insurgency and the population when the insurgents are the population?  You know, when the population is the insurgency.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Let's talk about-- another issue that was raised earlier.  And that is what do we do about Karzai?  I mean, this is-- this is a big issue in Washington right now that he is-- he's a partner that is giving-- the Obama administration heartburn.  Is there anything-- and-- and he's clearly affecting the-- the-- how the population sees both the United States and the A-- the Afghan government.  Is there anything we can do?

     TOM DONNELLY:

Well, actually I think it matters-- seems to matter more to Americans than it does to Afghans.  I mean, might be a narrowly run thing.  But all the-- you know, and it seems like a self-inflicted wound.  In fact, you know, Afghan expectations about the election were relatively low.  You know-- this is not-- this is not a full--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

You mean corruption in--

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Threaded defense of--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--The election, right.

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Of Karzai by any stretch of the imagination.  Whatever tissue of a democratic process there is in Afghanistan we are tearing by undercutting Karzai.  And it's even worse because as we throw him under the bus he keeps popping back up.  But we're not even doing it effectively.  And so we've created this situation where Karzai says, "Well, I might just join the Taliban."  I mean, that-- that-- you couldn't have a worse sort of-- metric--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

So you're saying--

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Of s-- failure.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--We're kind of stuck-- we're kind of stuck with him and he's not that big of problem anyway.

     TOM DONNELLY:

He is what-- what we've got.  And we don't have an alternative.  Again the-- the-- the elections kind of, you know, even-- if you strip away the corruption from the election it's pretty clear that he's the strongest local actor-- in Afghanistan.  There isn't-- a locally credible substitute-- for him.  And-- w-- we look ineffectual as well as indecisive.  So it's almost as bad as it could possibly be.

     (OVERTALK)

     JIM GLASSMAN:

L-- let me just ask Matthew and I'll-- and I'll get back to you.  Isn't there an issue here with values?  I mean, you know, I-- I just finished-- interviewing Afghan women.  And, you know, to them what we did-- eight years ago was a godsend.  I mean, they were-- now they're able to go back to school.  They're be-- they're able to get healthcare.  And-- to reconcile with the Taliban or to-- or to abandon Afghanistan or even to pull troops out really leaves them in a tremendously exposed position.

     MATTHEW HOH:

I could tell you that part of that is the real Pashtun culture.  In a city of 30,000 where I was at where we had over 2,000 coalition troops and Afghan forces the women were all still covered.  The-- the girls didn't go to school.  That's part of the Pashtun culture.

 

The-- the problem with that is-- and-- and my heart goes out to the Afghan women.  I've seen them.  I-- I've seen what it's like.  But-- is-- should the United States be waging war to change someone's culture?  That's what it comes down to for me on-- on that issue.

 

And, you know, is this-- and what I find is we keep chasing different rationales or reasons for being in Afghanistan.  This time last year we were rushing tens of thousands of American marines and soldiers-- into Afghanistan to ensure free and fair elections.  I participated in election process in southern Afghanistan.  I can tell you two things.  1) The raw Pashtuns boycotted the elections.  And 2) the Karzai government stole them.  Absolutely stole them.  And that's a slap in the face to every American service member who served there, let alone the families of those who were-- who have-- family members who have been killed there-- was the stolen elections.

     ANDREW EXUM:

Right now we simply have to buy time and space for certain institutions within Afghanistan to be built up to the degree that they're-- that they're still sustainable.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Actually at--

     ANDREW EXUM:

Or there's--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Least-- that-- that leads to my next question.

     ANDREW EXUM:

Great.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Amba-- I interviewed Ambassador Jawad recently, the Afghan Ambassador to the United States.  And he told me that success depends on the resilience of international partners in Afghanistan including-- most importantly the United States.  So how long should the United States be in Afghanistan?

     TOM DONNELLY:

A long time.  I mean, one place that I would-- agree with Matthew-- on is that this is-- a fight that's not going to be settled in the near-term.  Our 18 month horizon-- or down to 15 months now is way too short.  There's a saying that everybody knows and everybody repeats because it's true.  That Americans have all the-- or the westerners have all the watches and the Afghans have all the time.  And that sort of captures particularly how the Afghan people look at this.  And how the Pakistanis look at this.  And how the Indians-- in fact, everybody else-- takes a long-term view except for us.  So we've been very--

     MATTHEW HOH:

I want to s--

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Very impatient to--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

So you--

     TOM DONNELLY:

--Our detriment.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--So do you believe what-- what President Obama says?  We're-- we're going to-- we're going to have a surge but we're then-- we're-- but by the way we're pulling out.

     ANDREW EXUM:

Well, I think--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Is-- is that going to happen?

     ANDREW EXUM:

--When-- when President Obama first talked about that 18 month time horizon I was among the many who I think were-- were a little bit-- upset about it for the reason that he had kind of two audiences he has to address, right?  He has to address the American people, people of other troop contributing nations to reassure them that we're not going to be in Afghanistan forever.

 

But he's also got to tell the-- the people of Afghanistan who have to make a decision in this conflict as well as the Taliban and their supporters in Pakistan that, hey, our troop levels may go up and down, our financial commitment may go up and down.  But our interests in Afghanistan are enduring.  He didn't do that very well.  You know, setting that 18-month time period.

 

But there's-- there's a third dimension here.  And that when we talk about influing the-- influencing the behavior of the Afghan political class that 18-month time horizon actually becomes quite useful.  So I think that we can use that to a degree to affect the behavior of the Afghan--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Useful because--

     (OVERTALK)

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--The Americans are leaving and that's-- that-- that makes the-- the--

     (OVERTALK)

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Politically that--

     MATTHEW HOH:

A-- absolutely.  You know, working with Afghan government officials and-- when I was there-- there was no honest desire to reconcile with the other side.  Because the United States was propping them up.  When you'd ask them how long should the U.S. be here for-- the responses back would always be 20 to 30 years.  Except of course when you talk to an Afghan villager who said, "Just leave us alone.  I don't want any of you here.  Leave us alone."

 

But so what I s-- think happened with that withdrawal date and why it was a good thing was it forced the Karzai regime to realize that their days of being propped up by American military force may not be that long.  And that we now need to reconcile.  We need to-- we need to find a way-- to settle this.  And so I think that's why we're seeing very public statements by the Karzai regime-- since December advocating for-- reconciliation with of course this--

     TOM DONNELLY:

Yup, but that's when--

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Piece to--

     (OVERTALK)

     TOM DONNELLY:

--We started complaining about Karzai's behavior.  You can almost track these things through time.  (LAUGH) When Karzai got the message that we-- we were seriously thinking about getting out.  And there's always an asterisk with the Obama administration.  We'll begin the draw down maybe in July.  So, you know, that's when he started hedging against the fact that the prop to his power wasn't going to be there.  So he has to-- he has to bring back all the-- the thugs that they threw out before to help him stay-- steal the election.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Unfortunately we're going to have to-- we're going to have to wrap up.  And I just want to ask a quick question all around the table.  Just take a guess.  How long do you think United States military forces are going to be in Afghanistan?

     MATTHEW HOH:

In a combat role for five or six years.  That's not what I want to see.  But I-- I believe we'll be there in a--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

You'd like--

     MATTHEW HOH:

--Combat role--

     JIM GLASSMAN:

--Us to leave-- or certainly leave within 18 months.

     MATTHEW HOH:

--I'd like us to have a withdraw-- in line with a negotiated settlement.  But I've also been calling a cease-fire because I don't see the fighting that we're doing accomplishing anything.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Tom?

     TOM DONNELLY:

I-- I would want to not accept the distinction between combat and not combat.  And I think at some level we'll be there for decades and decades.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Andrew?

     ANDREW EXUM:

I think that we've got about another 18 months of-- of hard fighting at which point we'll start transitioning over a course of another two years to some sort of foreign internal defense or security force assistance.  And I think that's going to continue for another five to ten years.  I'd say-- I'd say ten to 15 years.

     JIM GLASSMAN:

Thank you Andrew, thank you Tom and thank you Matthew.  And that's it for this addition of Ideas in Action.  For more on this episode and other shows go to www.IdeasInActionTV.com.  I'm Jim Glassman, thanks for watching.

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